

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



Regional Seminar for Certain African Countries on the Implementation and Use of Several Patent-Related Flexibilities

**Topic 8: Compulsory Licenses** 

**Durban, South Africa January 29 to 31, 2013** 

### Enhancing Access to Medicines through Licenses

**Regional Seminar on Patent-Related Flexibilities** 

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# Some underlying health facts

- Between 20 % and 60 % of the health budget in LIC goes to medicines expenditures
- In some countries, up to 80 to 90 % of medicines are purchased outof-pocket as opposed to being paid for by health insurance schemes
- In 2009, in 36 out of 89 countries for which data are available out-ofpocket expenditures for health accounted for more than 50 per cent of total health spending
- Average availability of selected generic medicines in LMICs:
  - public sector less than 42 %
  - private sector almost 72 %



# What is a license?

Contract between two parties = outcome of a negotiation process

Patent holder allows the contracting party to use the patent (to exercise the patented invention)

Against a payment of royalties or free-of-charge

- For a defined period of time
- Worldwide or in specific countries (defined territory)
- Subject to additional conditions



#### **Recent compulsory licenses & government use**

Country	Medicine	Indication	Measure	Period	Royalties	Remarks
India	trastuzumab; ixabelone; dasatinib	Breast cancer; leukemia	CL	2013	To be decided	Decision pending
Ecuador	abacavir/lam ivudine	HIV/AIDS	CL	2012	5%	Local prod.
Indonesia	Seven products	HIV/AIDS; hepatitis B	Gov use	2012	0.5%	Local prod.
India	sorafenib	Cancer	CL	2012	6%	Local prod.
Ecuador	ritonavir	HIV/AIDS	CL	2010	5%	Import; local prod.
Thailand	erlotinib; letrozole; docetaxel; clopidogrel; Lopinavir/rito navir	Cancer, heart disease HIV/AIDS	Gov use	2006-2008	3-5%	Import
Brazil	efavirenz	HIV/AIDS	CL	2007	1.5%	Import & local prod.

# **Example: India/sorafenib**

- Anti-cancer medicine: sorafenib (Nexavar Bayer)
- Compulsory license issued on request of local generic company in 2012 for local production.
- Reason: unaffordable price
- •Generic price: USD 175/120 tablets
- •Originator price: USD 5500/120 tablets
- = 97% reduction



# **Example: Brazil/efavirenz**

# HIV/AIDS treatment: efavirenz (Merck Sharp&Dome)

Government issues a CL after protracted negotiations with the patent owner.


### Reason: high price

- •Generic price: USD 0.43 per dose
- •Originator price: USD 1.59 per dose
- = 73% reduction

But it took two years to set up local production...



# **Example: South Africa/stavudine**



# **Example: oseltamivir**

### Pandemic pressure leads to licenses:

#### **Problem:**

- Threat of H5N1 (avian flu) pandemic: patent holder faced explosive demand
- Countries threaten to use compulsory licenses
- Some countries later discover that there is no patent
- one compulsory license issued, but finally not used

#### Solution:

- Patent holder issues a worldwide call to apply for sub-licenses
- Royalty-bearing licenses granted to four generic companies
- Limited to pandemic preparedness (emergency situation) allowing for governmental stockpiling



# Socially responsible licensing

#### **Objective:**

- To ensure that licenses are negotiated in a way that facilitates access to the licensed product in countries in need of affordable prices/for patients
- Adds a dimension of social responsibility to the economic dimension of licensing without necessarily compromising the business (in developed countries)
  - When is a license socially responsible?





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#### **Voluntary licenses**

Company	Medicine	Indication	Geographic al scope	Number of Licensees	No of countries	Remarks
BMS	ATV ddl; d4T	HIV/AIDS	SSA, India	7 >3	48 50	immunity- from-suit
Boehringer	NVP/TPV	HIV/AIDS	All Africa, LDC, LIC; India	Several	75	immunity- from-suit agreements
Gilead / MPP	TDF (FDC) EVG/Quad COBI	HIV/AIDS	unlimited	Country list	112 100 103	
MSD (Merck)	EFV RAL	HIV/AIDS	SA SSA, LIC	6 2	1 60	EFV: No patents in SSA outside SA
Roche	SQV oseltamivir	HIV/AIDS; influenza	SSA; LDC Africa; China; India	13	65	oseltamivir for pandemic prepared.
Tibotec (J&J)	DRV ETR RIL	HIV/AIDS	SSA; LDC; India Country list	2 2 5	65 65 112	
ViiV (GSK&	AZT; 3TC;	HIV/AIDS	SSA; LDC;	11	68	



Initiated by UNITAID in 2010 with the objective to

- negotiate license agreements with companies regarding HIV/AIDS products, with the aim of sub-licensing these products to generic companies to increase access to treatment in low- and middle-income countries.
- assemble the necessary intellectual property rights regarding key HIV/AIDS products in order to develop new fixed-dose combination products that unite different products in one pill or formulation
- develop missing paediatric formulations of existing treatments.



# **Medicines Patent Pool**

#### **Achievements**

- Expansion of territory for licenses
- License to Gilead's TDF (tenovofir) combination with other products.
- In collaboration with WIPO establishment of patent database for antiretrovirals

#### Criticism

- But still limited territory excluding most middleincome countries
- Relation between royalties and actual patent coverage
- Transparency of the process
- Involvement of patient groups



# **Trends & Challenges: Compulsory license**

- established flexibility under TRIPS Agreement
- has been used by a number of countries to lower prices and make medicines more affordable with a recent increase in 2012
- initially focus on HIV/AIDS, now also medicines for noncommunicable diseases



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# **Trends & Challenges: Voluntary licenses**

- Competition policy, Medicines Patent Pool and industry's attention to performance ratings on Access to Medicines Index led to expansion: 7 out of 8 originator ARV companies grant licenses
- More recent agreements cover new and pipeline products, but limited to HIV/AIDS
- Average territory expanded from SSA, LDCs and LICs to up to 112 countries. (Upper)-middle-income countries still mostly excluded
- Trend towards lower royalties; except for agreements covering new products and more extensive territory
- Agreements have to ensure robust competition and include tech transfer where necessary

### Contact

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P. Beyer. Developing socially responsible intellectual property licensing policies – voluntary licensing initiatives in the pharmaceutical sector. *Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Licensing.* Edward Elgar, 2012 (forthcoming).



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